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Vol. 12:3] David Scheffer 
Proposal for an International Criminal Court 
Arrest Procedures Protocol 
 
By David Scheffer 
 
¶1  The International Criminal Court continues to face the challenge of apprehending 
or facilitating the surrender of indicted fugitives. At the end of April 2014, ten indicted 
individuals remained at large and two indicted individuals were in domestic custody in 
Libya.1 While Part 9 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court requires all 
States Parties to cooperate in the investigation of suspects and the capture and arrest of 
indicted fugitives on their respective territories,2 there have arisen circumstances where 
indicted individuals have remained at large for relatively long periods of time even when 
their presence on a State Party’s territory is generally known or suspected.3 Some of the 
indicted fugitives are men of great power, such as President Omar Hassan Ahmad Al 
Bashir of Sudan,4 who have the means to shield themselves behind their country’s non-
party status under the Rome Statute and by the absence of effective Security Council 
enforcement action to compel the surrender of such high-level officials.5 Other indicted 
fugitives have the advantage of stealth and escape into the forested environs of central 
Africa, as well as associates who facilitate their avoidance of arrest.6 Joseph Kony and his 
                                                        
David Scheffer is the Mayer Brown/Robert A. Helman Professor of Law and Director of the Center for 
International Human Rights at Northwestern University School of Law. He was the U.S. Ambassador at 
Large for War Crimes Issues from 1997 to 2001. He expresses appreciation for the financial support of the 
Open Society Justice Initiative for the project underlying this article. The views expressed in this article are 
strictly those of the author and do not necessarily reflect any views held by the Office of the Prosecutor of 
the International Criminal Court or by the Open Society Justice Initiative. 
1
 For an update on the number of indicted fugitives of the International Criminal Court, see Situations and 
Cases, ICC, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited May 
24, 2014). 
2
 United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International 
Criminal Court, Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, UN Doc. A/CONF.183/9 
art. 86, 89, corrected Nov. 10, 1998, and July 12, 1999, available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/ADD16852-AEE9-4757-ABE7-9CDC7CF02886/283503/RomeStatutEng1.pdf 
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
3
 Situation in Darfur, Sudan, ICC, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200205/Pages/situation%20ic
c-0205.aspx (last visited May 22, 2014); see Beth van Schaack, ICC Fugitives: The Need for Bespoke 
Solutions, Comment to Invited Experts on Arrest Question, ICC FORUM (Feb. 13, 2014), 
http://iccforum.com/arrest. 
4
 See Situations and Cases, supra note 1. 
5
 See van Schaack, supra note 3. 
6
 See id. 
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indicted colleagues in the Lord’s Resistance Army7 have evaded arrest despite the active 
pursuit of the Ugandan military accompanied by U.S. military advisers.8 
¶2  Northwestern University School of Law, with the generous support of the Open 
Society Justice Initiative, convened a set of closed-door meetings in the Office of the 
Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in November 2011 to discuss a wide range 
of issues pertaining to government cooperation on surrenders and arrest capabilities and 
tactics. One of the prospects for further consideration raised at the meetings was the 
creation of some kind of special operations unit that could be deployed relatively quickly 
into the territory of consenting Parties to the Protocol (“Protocol Parties”) for the purpose 
of professionally tracking and apprehending, or facilitating the surrender of, any indicted 
fugitive on the territory of that Protocol Party.  
¶3  Having previously written general thoughts on this issue,9 I have drafted the 
“International Criminal Court Arrest Procedures Protocol” set forth below, with 
commentary following each article of the Protocol, in an effort to present at least one 
detailed approach to the challenge for relevant parties and scholars to consider in the near 
future.10   
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT ARREST PROCEDURES PROTOCOL 
Preamble 
¶4 The Parties to this Protocol,  
¶5  
¶6 Affirming the obligation of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court to comply with requests for arrest and surrender of indicted fugitives in 
accordance with Part 9 of the Rome Statute and with the procedures under their 
respective national laws, 
¶7  
¶8 Emphasizing the importance of achieving the arrest or surrender of indicted fugitives of 
the International Criminal Court as quickly as possible so as to advance the cause of 
international justice and to defeat impunity for the commission of atrocity crimes within 
the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, 
¶9  
¶10 Recognizing that a State may not possess or find opportunity to exercise the requisite 
capabilities in particular circumstances to successfully undertake the arrest or surrender 
                                                        
7
 See Uganda, ICC, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200204/related%20cases/icc
%200204%200105/Pages/uganda.aspx (last visited Apr. 4, 2014). 
8
 See van Schaack, supra note 3. 
9
 See David Scheffer, The Enforcement of International Criminal Court Arrest Warrants, in THE RISE OF 
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 175 (Kelly Askin ed., 2013); David Scheffer, Maximizing Opportunities to Deter 
Further Atrocity Crimes, Comment to Invited Experts on Prevention Question, ICC FORUM (Oct. 6, 2011), 
http://iccforum.com/prevention#Scheffer; David Scheffer, David Scheffer’s Arrest Lecture, ICC FORUM 
(Feb. 5, 2013), http://iccforum.com/forum/arrest-lecture. 
10
 For a detailed examination of the state of International Criminal Court arrest policies and procedures, see 
Invited Experts on Arrest Question, ICC FORUM, (Feb. 13, 2014), http://iccforum.com/arrest. 
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of indicted fugitives of the International Criminal Court believed to be on the territory of 
such State, 
¶11  
¶12 Determined to ensure that custody of indicted fugitives is accomplished forthrightly so 
that their right to be tried without undue delay before the International Criminal Court 
can be enforced or, in the alternative, the procedures for national prosecution and trial 
can be followed in a timely manner pursuant to principles of admissibility under the 
Rome Statute, 
¶13  
¶14 Reaffirming the Purposes and Principles of the Charter of the United Nations, and in 
particular that all States shall refrain from the threat or use of force against the 
territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any manner inconsistent 
with the Purposes of the United Nations, 
¶15  
¶16 Emphasizing in this connection that nothing in this Protocol shall be taken as authorizing 
any Party to this Protocol to intervene in an armed conflict or in the internal affairs of 
any State, 
¶17  
¶18 Determined to provide the means, with the consent of the State in question, to track and 
arrest or arrange the surrender of indicted fugitives and their transport to the 
International Criminal Court to stand trial or, in the event it is determined under the 
Rome Statute that national prosecution shall proceed, to the appropriate national 
authorities,  
¶19  
¶20 Resolved to respect fully the sovereign authority of any State upon which territory the 
personnel provided pursuant to this Protocol are invited by such State to operate in order 
to track and achieve the custody of indicted fugitives of the International Criminal Court, 
¶21  
¶22 Have agreed as follows: 
Commentary: 
¶23  The Preamble sets forth the parameters of the dilemma, the aspirations of the States 
Parties of the International Criminal Court, and the determination to provide the means to 
track and arrest or arrange the surrender of the indicted fugitives.  
¶24  First, there is an affirmation of the Part 9 procedures of the Rome Statute,11 as they 
are the paramount means of securing the arrest of indicted fugitives. The Protocol serves 
only as a default option in the event Part 9 procedures prove futile and the “receiving” 
                                                        
11
 See Rome Statute, supra note Error! Bookmark not defined.2, at art. 86-102. Part 9 of the Rome 
Statute is entitled, “International Cooperation and Judicial Assistance” and consists of Articles 86-102 of 
the Rome Statute. Id. Surrender and arrest procedures are covered within Part 9, as well as Rules 181-197 
of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the International Criminal Court. Id.; The Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, rules 181-97, ICC-ASP/1/3 and Corr.1 (Sept. 3-10, 2002). For example, Article 89 of the 
Rome Statute concerns “Surrender of persons to the Court.” Rome Statute, supra note Error! Bookmark 
not defined.2, at art. 89. Article 91 covers “Contents of request for arrest and surrender.” Id. at art. 91. 
Article 92 sets forth requirements for “Provisional arrest.” Id. at art. 92. 
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Party to the Protocol consents to deployment of highly skilled experts to track and arrest 
indicted fugitives. 
¶25  Second, the Preamble reaffirms the Parties’ allegiance to the United Nations 
Charter and the Charter’s prohibition on the use or threat of force against any State in a 
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.12 This is important to 
clarify up front in the document so that the consensual, voluntary, and non-aggressive 
character of the deployment of the ICC Protocol Team onto the sovereign territory of a 
Protocol Party for a very limited objective is clearly understood. The sovereignty of the 
consenting and thus receiving Party of the ICC Protocol Team is a primary, if not the 
primary, right to be protected and preserved in this exercise. This is essential for the 
participation of any government in any such plan.  
ARTICLE I 
PURPOSE OF THE PROTOCOL 
¶26  The purpose of this Protocol is to establish the means by which highly skilled and 
trained personnel and equipment can be made available for deployment into a consenting 
State to track and arrest or facilitate the surrender of indicted fugitives of the 
International Criminal Court and transport them either to the International Criminal 
Court or to appropriate national authorities where national prosecution has been 
approved by the International Criminal Court. 
Commentary:  
¶27  The purpose provision states the limited character of the Protocol, namely to 
establish the means to track and apprehend indicted fugitives as effectively as possible 
and to transport them to The Hague, or to any other agreed location.  
ARTICLE II 
PARTIES TO THE PROTOCOL 
¶28  As its participation is required to carry out the procedures and responsibilities of 
this Protocol, the International Criminal Court shall be a Party to this Protocol provided 
the Assembly of States Parties approves ratification thereof. Any Member State of the 
United Nations and any international or regional organization or defense alliance 
approved for this purpose by the Assembly of States Parties to the International Criminal 
Court may sign and ratify or accede to this Protocol and become a Party to the Protocol. 
Any such approval by the Assembly of States Parties shall be pursuant to Article 112 of 
the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure of the Assembly of States Parties.  
                                                        
12
 See U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4. 
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Commentary: 
¶29  The range of eligible parties to the Protocol spans across Member States of the 
United Nations, the International Criminal Court, and other designated organizations. 
While this makes for a potentially diverse pool of parties including governments and 
international or regional organizations of varied character, the objective is to ensure that 
the ICC Protocol Team can function effectively with the right cast of participating 
supporters. The participation of the International Criminal Court, particularly the ICC 
Prosecutor and ICC Registrar, is essential, and various Protocol provisions make that 
clear. The International Criminal Court is a vital player in the entire structure of the 
Protocol and in the performance of the ICC Protocol Team, and thus the Court must be a 
treaty party to the Protocol so that it can enter into force and then be implemented. This 
would require the Assembly of States Parties of the ICC to approve the ICC Arrest 
Procedures Protocol, and to do so initially so as to stimulate governmental ratifications 
that achieve the minimum number required for entry into force.  
¶30  The governments that join the Protocol most likely would be States Parties to the 
Rome Statute, but they need not be. Any Member State of the United Nations is eligible 
to join the Protocol. This would facilitate a non-party to the Rome Statute to join the 
Protocol if, for example, that government has a special interest in assisting with the arrest 
of indicted fugitives on its territory and yet cannot achieve ratification of the Rome 
Statute in a timely fashion, or a government that, while a non-party to the Rome Statute, 
nonetheless wishes to provide assistance for tracking and arrest operations either 
generally or in a particular situation and finds participation in the Protocol useful for its 
own national purposes.  
¶31  There could be real value attached to the participation of certain organizations in 
the Protocol. These could include the European Union, the African Union, NATO, 
INTERPOL, EUROPOL, the Organization of American States, and the United Nations. 
These types of organizations can provide critical assistance to the ICC Protocol Team 
under varied circumstances and benefit from the apprehension of indicted fugitives who 
can threaten international peace and security while remaining at large. In theory any one 
of them could join with the International Criminal Court as an institutional party to the 
Protocol and thus participate in the work of the ICC Protocol Team through the provision 
of important forms of assistance. But any such organization would have to be approved in 
advance for party status in the Protocol by the Assembly of States Parties to the 
International Criminal Court. This is important to ensure that any organizational 
participant is acceptable to the International Criminal Court for engagement (however 
structured or detached in character) in tracking and arrest operations, which typically are 
very sensitive matters to orchestrate. The International Criminal Court also should 
consider the desirability of any particular organization being entitled to a vote in the 
Protocol Supervisory Group (PSG) as provided in the Protocol. Thus, the Court’s 
discretion is a necessary component in determining which organizations would be 
eligible for and acceptable for membership in the Protocol. 
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ARTICLE III 
CREATION AND FUNCTIONS OF THE ICC PROTOCOL SUPERVISORY GROUP 
1. Within 30 days of receipt by the Registrar of the International Criminal Court, who 
would serve as the Depository of the Protocol, of the required number of ratifications 
or accessions to this Protocol, the Parties to the Protocol shall convene a meeting to 
examine and discuss the implementation of the Protocol and initiate administrative and 
logistical measures for creation of the ICC Protocol Supervisory Group (hereinafter 
“PSG”) within 60 days of such meeting. 
 
2. The PSG shall be comprised of one delegate from each Party to the Protocol. The PSG 
delegates shall elect a Chairperson from among such delegates by majority vote for a 
single four-year non-renewable term. A Party whose delegate has served as 
Chairperson cannot hold the position for two consecutive terms. 
 
3. The headquarters of the PSG shall be located in The Hague, Netherlands. Meetings of 
the PSG shall take place in The Hague or elsewhere as determined by the Chairperson 
of the PSG. 
 
4. The functions of the PSG are: 
a. to agree upon and supervise the coordination among the Parties of the selection 
and training of personnel, including leaders, of the ICC Protocol Team as well 
as acquisition of supplies and equipment for the ICC Protocol Team; 
b. to determine when to deliver a request for deployment of the ICC Protocol Team 
to the Party on which territory the ICC Prosecutor has reason to believe one or 
more indicted fugitives are located or are transiting frequently enough to merit 
a track and arrest operation on such territory, to obtain the advance written 
consent of the Party receiving the ICC Protocol Team on its territory (the 
“Receiving Party”), and to confirm that the ICC Prosecutor recommends 
deployment of the ICC Protocol Team to the Receiving Party’s territory for such 
purpose; 
c. to respond to any issues or questions raised by the Receiving Party and 
facilitate the cooperation of the Receiving Party; 
d. to determine, based upon the advice received from the leadership of the ICC 
Protocol Team, the precise timing and character of the deployment of the ICC 
Protocol Team to the territory of the Receiving Party; 
e. to determine, based on the advice received from the Joint Command Group (as 
defined in Article V(2)) or the request of the Receiving Party, the schedule and 
character of withdrawal of all or part of the ICC Protocol Team from the 
territory of the Receiving Party; 
f. to prepare, examine, and approve the annual budgets of the Joint Command 
Group, the ICC Protocol Team, and of the PSG. 
 
5. The written consent of a Receiving Party relating to the planned deployment of the ICC 
Protocol Team on its territory shall be delivered prior to any such deployment to the 
Registrar of the International Criminal Court, with simultaneous copy to the PSG. 
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6. The PSG shall act on the basis of consensus when possible and by recorded majority 
vote when consensus is not achieved.  
 
7. The PSG shall act secretly when necessary to preserve the secrecy of a sealed 
indictment, the secrecy of a deployment or particular operation, the secrecy of a 
withdrawal of all or part of the ICC Protocol Team from a Receiving Party, or at the 
explicit request of a Receiving Party for as long as the PSG considers appropriate. 
Commentary: 
¶32  Article III describes how the decision-making body, namely the ICC Protocol 
Supervisory Group (“PSG”), would be created and stipulates its functions. The first step 
would be a management meeting of the Parties to the Protocol once the minimum number 
for entry into force have ratified the Protocol. The number of days following entry into 
force for the first meeting—30 days—is arbitrary and could be modified during the 
drafting stage. The number of days for the actual establishment of the PSG is also 
arbitrarily set at 90 days, and could be altered during drafting.  
¶33  Each Party to the Protocol would have a seat at the table of the PSG. This includes 
governmental and institutional parties. For example, the ICC would have a voting seat, as 
would INTERPOL if it chose to join the Protocol, and each State ratifying or otherwise 
joining the Protocol would have a voting seat. The Chairperson of the PSG would be the 
delegate of one of the Parties, elected to the post by a majority of the total membership of 
the PSG, and that individual would serve for a four-year non-renewable term. The 
delegate of any Party to the Protocol cannot serve two consecutive terms as Chairperson, 
a choice reflected in the drafting so that no Party becomes a dominant actor in the process 
and so that leadership can be appropriately shared over the years as is done in other 
organizations. 
¶34  The logical location for the headquarters of the PSG would be The Hague so that it 
is proximate to the headquarters of the ICC Protocol Team itself, as well as being 
proximate to the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC, with which the PSG would meet 
frequently for briefings and guidance. While meetings of the PSG normally would take 
place in the headquarters located in The Hague, there should be flexibility for the PSG to 
meet elsewhere at the discretion of the Chairperson. This could be particularly useful if a 
Party volunteered to host a meeting in its capital or headquarters (for an organization 
such as NATO if it were to join the Protocol) and even offered to cover the travel 
expenses of the delegates for this purpose.  
¶35  The functions of the PSG are set forth in Article III(4) and are largely self-
explanatory. The most ambiguous function as stated in the Protocol is the Article III(4)(a) 
mandate for the PSG to “agree upon and supervise” the selection and training of ICC 
Protocol Team personnel. That responsibility would require the PSG to develop plans and 
procedures for selection and training purposes in coordination with Parties providing 
personnel (the “Sending Parties”), a task that is better left to the PSG itself when it meets 
and examines options and available resources. 
¶36  The PSG would have to make the formal request to a Protocol Party for the latter’s 
consent to deployment of the ICC Protocol Team onto its territory. Prior to doing so, 
however, the PSG would need to receive confirmation from the ICC Prosecutor that she 
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or he has reason to believe the indicted fugitive is located on such territory or is transiting 
it frequently enough to merit a track and arrest operation in that country and that the ICC 
Prosecutor recommends deployment of the ICC Protocol Team for this purpose. 
¶37  The PSG should stand prepared to respond to all inquiries from the Receiving Party 
prior to and during the deployment of the ICC Protocol Team so that misunderstandings 
are avoided and the operation can proceed efficiently and with the full cooperation of the 
Receiving Party. The PSG would make the decision, based upon advice from the 
leadership of the ICC Protocol Team, when and how to deploy the ICC Protocol Team to 
the territory of the Receiving Party. Likewise, the PSG would make the decision on 
withdrawal of all or part of the ICC Protocol Team based upon the advice of the ICC 
Protocol Team and/or at the request of the Receiving Party or of a Sending Party.  
¶38  The PSG would bear the responsibility to prepare, review, and approve the budgets 
of the ICC Protocol Team and of the PSG itself.  
¶39  Given the requirement that the ICC Protocol Team would not deploy to the territory 
of a Party unless and until the ICC Prosecutor seeks such deployment and the Receiving 
Party has consented to such deployment, one would expect that the PSG would act on a 
largely consensus basis to reach decisions pertaining to the deployment and the ICC 
Protocol Team’s operations on the Receiving Party’s territory. But where consensus 
cannot be achieved, then the majority-vote rule would be used to arrive at decisions. 
¶40  There may be situations where the PSG must act in secrecy, at least until such time 
as a particular deployment or matter of interest can be revealed publicly. Article III(7) 
permits such secrecy in particular circumstances, namely, deployment of a particular 
operation by the ICC Protocol Team, operational details relating to partial or full 
withdrawal, or a Receiving Party’s interest in maintaining secrecy, at least for some 
period of time, given the political or logistical risks that could arise with a publicly-
announced deployment or withdrawal of the ICC Protocol Team. 
ARTICLE IV 
CREATION AND COMPOSITION OF THE ICC PROTOCOL TEAM 
1. The PSG shall convene no later than 90 days following its establishment to undertake 
the procedures set forth below for the creation of the ICC Protocol Team. 
 
2. The ICC Protocol Team shall be comprised of personnel from Parties to the Protocol 
(each hereafter referred to as the “Sending Party”), command leadership drawn from 
such Protocol Parties, and the necessary infrastructure support such as 
communications, weapons, supplies, and logistical assistance.  
 
3. The PSG may seek or obtain training and logistical assistance for the ICC Protocol 
Team from any non-party State or any public or private group or entity organized under 
or incorporated in such non-party State, provided the PSG approves of such non-Party 
State or any such entity participating pursuant to an agreement or contract entered into 
between either the non-party State or the relevant public or private group and the PSG 
and further provided that the non-party State or public or private group agrees in 
writing to comply fully with the obligations of Article VI of the Protocol. 
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4. The headquarters of the ICC Protocol Team shall be located in The Hague, 
Netherlands. The main training and base camp of the ICC Protocol Team shall be 
established on the territory of any Protocol Party that offers and establishes such a site 
following PSG approval. The field headquarters for any particular operation may be 
established in or proximate to the territory of any Party in which the ICC Protocol 
Team is deployed on mission. 
 
5. Parties to the Protocol are encouraged to commit requisite personnel, supplies, or 
logistical support to the creation and operation of the ICC Protocol Team, which would 
be sustainable only to the extent that such support is provided by the Protocol Parties.  
 
6. The PSG shall activate the ICC Protocol Team on a standby basis for possible 
deployment on any approved mission provided the PSG has determined that sufficient 
personnel, supplies, and logistical support for an operational tracking and arrest team 
have been committed for an effective organizational and operational capability and 
funding is sufficient to sustain a standby capacity.  
Commentary: 
¶41  Once the PSG is established and a Chairperson is elected, one of the group’s first 
responsibilities would be the establishment of the ICC Protocol Team, which would be 
the operative means by which to track and arrest the indicted fugitives. The Protocol 
requires a timeline of 90 days within which the PSG would plan for a meeting that 
launches the creation of the ICC Protocol Team. There is no set timeline for actual 
creation of the ICC Protocol Team, as that would be part of the planning process resulting 
from the first PSG meeting on the subject. 
¶42  The composition of the ICC Protocol Team would consist of military, law 
enforcement personnel (including investigators), and civilian personnel from Protocol 
Parties that have been voluntarily committed to the ICC Protocol Team by such Parties. 
This means that some Parties to the Protocol might decide not to contribute personnel, 
but instead to support the ICC Protocol Team and the PSG through payment of the 
required assessments under the Protocol and perhaps to provide supplies and logistical 
support to the ICC Protocol Team. The Protocol does not envisage private contractors 
being part of the ICC Protocol Team, but that is a subject that could be further explored 
in negotiations over the text of the draft Protocol. As provided in Article X(3), the 
salaries and benefits of the personnel provided to the ICC Protocol Team would be 
covered by the Sending Party.  
¶43  The command leadership of the ICC Protocol Team would be drawn from the ranks 
of the personnel committed by the individual Protocol Parties; details about the command 
structure are provided in Article V. The rationale for drawing the leadership strictly from 
contributing Protocol Parties rests on simple command principles and political realities, 
namely that such Parties would be more willing to contribute personnel knowing that 
their commanders would be part of the command structure.  
¶44  The ICC Protocol Team also includes the non-personnel components of the Team, 
namely the communications, supplies, weapons, and logistical support necessary for the 
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efficient and professional operation of the Team in both its training facility and when 
deployed in the field.   
¶45  The Protocol, in Article IV(3), offers the opportunity for the PSG to reach 
agreement directly with a non-party State that may have capabilities in training or 
logistical support that would be useful for the ICC Protocol Team. Any public entity of 
such non-party State and any private contractor providing such services would have to be 
contracted under arrangements fully approved by the PSG, which must include the 
agreement of such non-party State or such public or private entity to comply with all of 
the Article VI conditions of the Protocol. This is intended to avoid the recent 
Iraq/Afghanistan experiences with private contractors and their possible non-compliance 
with international humanitarian law. There would need to be strict safeguards built into 
any PSG relationship with either public or private contractors of non-party States to avoid 
illegal behavior by such contractors. 
¶46  The geographical locations of various activities are spelled out in Article IV(4). 
The ICC Protocol Team headquarters would be located in The Hague, which would be 
expected to maintain close cooperation and coordination with the ICC Prosecutor and her 
or his staff. The training and base camp of the ICC Protocol Team could be established 
wherever it makes most sense for efficiency and operational effectiveness and as 
determined by the PSG in the future. The actual field headquarters of the ICC Protocol 
Team for any particular operation presumably would be established on the territory of the 
Receiving Party or perhaps an adjacent Party’s territory depending on the operational 
requirements of the particular mission. 
¶47  Protocol Parties are encouraged to commit personnel, supplies, or logistical support 
to the ICC Protocol Team and to incur the cost of any such commitments. Article X sets 
forth the financial requirements, namely that the costs of the personnel are to be covered 
by the Sending Party (unless voluntary funders step forward to cover part or all of such 
expenses), while the costs of supplies and logistical support should be covered to the 
extent possible by the Sending Party. Where coverage of non-personnel costs by the 
Sending Party is not possible, the PSG should factor into the budget such costs and 
determine the extent to which they can be paid for out of the budget on a case-by-case 
basis and/or by voluntary funders. This flexibility is built into the Protocol to afford the 
PSG and the ICC Protocol Team options in actually setting up their operations. Article X 
of the Protocol encourages voluntary contributions by Protocol Parties and by any State, 
organization, or private benefactor.  
¶48  The PSG would have the authority to activate the ICC Protocol Team on a “standby 
basis,” meaning that its operational readiness would be confirmed and it could thereafter 
be available for deployment in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Protocol. 
This action by the PSG would trigger the operational character of the ICC Protocol Team 
so that requests and approvals of its deployment onto the territory of a Receiving Party 
would be possible. 
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ARTICLE V 
COMMAND STRUCTURE OF THE ICC PROTOCOL TEAM 
1. Military commanders and civilian advisers of the ICC Protocol Team shall be 
nominated by the Protocol Parties committing personnel to the ICC Protocol Team; 
their qualifications shall be reviewed by the PSG; they shall be selected for duty by and 
with the approval of the PSG. 
 
2. The PSG shall establish the Joint Command Group, to be headquartered in The Hague, 
and consisting of at least one senior commanding officer from each Party dedicating 
military personnel to the ICC Protocol Team. The PSG shall designate among such 
senior commanding officers one force commander of the Joint Command Group (the 
“Force Commander”) who will chair its meetings and oversee its daily operations, who 
will be responsible for direct communications with and reporting to the PSG and the 
ICC Prosecutor, and who will coordinate communications and control measures among 
the senior commanding officers. The Force Commander shall determine the further 
delegation of authority in the ICC Protocol Team in consultation with the PSG and the 
Joint Command Group. 
 
3. Senior commanding officers of the Protocol Party contingents that make up the ICC 
Protocol Team shall report to the Force Commander on all operational matters and 
must not be given or accept instructions from their own national authorities that are 
contrary to the mandate of the operation. The Force Commander shall ensure that 
senior commanding officers are involved in operational planning and decision-making, 
especially where their respective national contingents are concerned. Such involvement 
shall take the form of regular consultations in a unified force. 
 
4. Operational authority of the Joint Command Group shall include the authority to issue 
operational directives within the limits of a specific operation and its specific 
geographic area (the mission area) and for an agreed period of time, with the 
stipulation that an earlier withdrawal of a contingent will require the Sending Party to 
provide reasonable prior notification. 
 
5. Senior commanding officers of national military units participating in ICC Protocol 
Team operations shall refer orders that are illegal under relevant national or 
international law or are outside the mandate of the particular operation to higher 
national authorities, if they are unable to resolve the matter with the Joint Command 
Group or with the Force Commander. No senior commanding officer shall carry out 
any order that violates relevant national law or international humanitarian law or the 
law of war or falls outside the mandate of the operation.  
 
6. Military, police, and other civilian personnel provided by any Party to the ICC Protocol 
Team shall be transferred to the operational control of the Joint Command Group for 
the purpose of unified command within the ICC Protocol Team. 
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7. Each Protocol Party contributing to the ICC Protocol Team shall retain and not 
relinquish command authority over its national forces and personnel. With respect to 
any particular operation undertaken by the ICC Protocol Team, national authorities 
shall place their forces and personnel under the temporary operational control of the 
Force Commander and Joint Command Group to perform such operation. The chain of 
command from the highest national authority to the senior commanding officer in the 
field with the ICC Protocol Team shall remain inviolate. Senior commanding officers 
shall maintain the capability to report separately to higher national military authorities, 
as well as to the Joint Command Group, provided that operational matters that must 
remain secret are handled in accordance with procedures to be approved by the PSG. 
 
8. National authorities of Sending Parties may at any time terminate the participation of 
their national contingent provided reasonable prior notice is delivered to the Joint 
Command Group and the PSG, which will advise the ICC Prosecutor.  
 
9. National authorities shall continue to exercise administrative control of their relevant 
national personnel in the ICC Protocol Team for purposes such as discipline and 
evaluation.  
Commentary: 
¶49  The command leadership would be comprised only of nationals of the Protocol 
Parties contributing personnel to the ICC Protocol Team. The PSG would review the 
qualifications of individuals nominated by such Protocol Parties and select officers for 
the ICC Protocol Team. There would be established a Joint Command Group, 
headquartered in The Hague, and comprised of one commander per Party selected by the 
PSG for the ICC Protocol Team (the “Joint Command Group”). The PSG would select a 
“Force Commander” from among the ranks of the commanders on the Joint Command 
Group. The Force Commander would chair the meetings of the Joint Command Group 
and oversee its day-to-day operations. He or she would be responsible for direct 
communications with the PSG and would coordinate communications and control 
measures among the commanders. Importantly, the Force Commander would determine 
the further delegation of authority within the ICC Protocol Team following consultation 
with the PSG and the Joint Command Group. 
¶50  Clear lines of operational command between the Joint Command Group and 
subordinate officers within the ICC Protocol Team would be established. The subordinate 
commanders of Party contingents would not receive or accept instructions from their 
national governments that would be contrary to the mandate of operations. The Force 
Commander must ensure that national contingent commanders are involved in 
operational planning and decision-making, especially where their respective contingents 
are concerned. Such involvement should take the form of regular consultations in a 
unified force. 
¶51  Article V(4) of the Protocol speaks to operational directives that can be issued by 
the Joint Command Group to implement actions within the limited mandate and 
geographical and temporal limitations of the operation. If a Sending State seeks to 
withdraw its contingent from an operation, it must give reasonable notification of such 
withdrawal. What constitutes “reasonable” could be left vague for the case-by-case 
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management of different situations, or further drafting considerations could establish a 
period of prior notification required for withdrawal of a national contingent.  
¶52  All commanders in the ICC Protocol Team would have the obligation not to carry 
out any orders that violate national law or international law and to report any such illegal 
orders to higher national authorities of their Sending State. In order to achieve a unified 
and coordinated command structure within the entire ICC Protocol Team, all military, 
police, and civilian personnel would fall under the operational command of the Joint 
Command Group.  
¶53  An important caveat in the command of national contingents that serve in the ICC 
Protocol Team is that their respective senior commanding officers retain command 
authority over national forces and personnel while placing them under the temporary 
operational control of the Joint Command Group. The senior commanding officers 
continue to report to their national superiors, but not with respect to secret operational 
matters for which the PSG would need to establish the procedures. Commanders of 
national contingents can withdraw their personnel from an operation provided reasonable 
notice is delivered to the Joint Command Group and the PSG. While deployed with the 
ICC Protocol Team, national personnel would continue to fall under the control of senior 
commanding officers with respect to the exercise of administrative control for purposes 
of discipline and evaluation. 
ARTICLE VI 
RESPECT FOR THE LAW 
1. The Joint Command Group shall command the ICC Protocol Team, and its personnel 
shall perform, in strict compliance with international law, including the law of war and 
international humanitarian law, and in a manner respectful of the sovereignty and 
national laws of the Receiving Party.  
 
2. The ICC Protocol Team shall use means and methods of combat or law enforcement 
that comply strictly with international law and norms. The ICC Protocol Team shall 
comply with relevant instruments of international humanitarian law and customary 
international law prohibiting or restricting the use of certain weapons and methods of 
combat. Military and police forces and other personnel of the ICC Protocol Team must 
make a clear distinction between civilians and combatants and conduct military 
operations only against combatants and military objectives in pursuit of indicted 
fugitives. In the treatment of civilians during any particular operation, the ICC Protocol 
Team shall provide special protection to women and children from rape, enforced 
prostitution and any other form of sexual violence or humiliation or indecent and 
criminal assault. 
 
3. All military, police, and civilian personnel of the ICC Protocol Team shall be subject to 
investigation and prosecution under their own national systems of military justice or 
civilian justice for their conduct with the ICC Protocol Team pursuant to procedures set 
forth in the Contingency Agreement required by Article VIII below, unless the Sending 
Party has waived this right for any particular individual(s) or the Sending Party is a 
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Member State of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and the alleged 
crime falls within the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute, in which case the Sending Party 
shall comply fully with its obligations under the Rome Statute and the Contingency 
Agreement. 
 
4. The ICC Protocol Team shall obey local laws and respect social, cultural and religious 
norms and customs that do not violate international norms of human rights protection. 
Personnel of the ICC Protocol Team shall maintain the highest standards of integrity 
for international civil servants and military and police forces in their personal conduct. 
Commentary: 
¶54  Article VI of the Protocol requires all commanders and personnel of the ICC 
Protocol Team to perform their duties and responsibilities in strict compliance with 
international humanitarian law and the law of war as well as relevant national law of the 
Receiving Party. This includes making a clear distinction between combatants and 
civilians, and providing special protection for women and children.  
¶55  Article VI opts for enforcement of legal standards under the law and courts of the 
Sending State, as is typical in Status of Forces and Status of Mission Agreements 
worldwide. It is highly doubtful any other formula would be acceptable to Sending States 
for deployment in the ICC Protocol Team. However, States Parties of the Rome Statute 
of the International Criminal Court are required to comply with the rules and procedures 
of the ICC in connection with the performance of their national personnel in the ICC 
Protocol Team if they are allegedly responsible for a crime falling within the jurisdiction 
of the Rome Statute.  
¶56  While local laws and customs are to be respected by the ICC Protocol Team, 
personnel must not act in a way that violates international norms of human rights 
protection. 
ARTICLE VII 
DEPLOYMENT OF THE ICC PROTOCOL TEAM 
1. The ICC Protocol Team may be deployed into the territory, including the airspace or 
territorial sea, of any Party to this Protocol in accordance with the procedures set forth 
in this article and the special arrangements negotiated in the Contingency Agreement 
between the PSG and such Receiving Party pursuant to Article VIII of this Protocol 
(“Contingency Agreement”). 
 
2. The ICC Protocol Team will deploy only onto the territory of a Party for the purpose of 
arresting or facilitating the surrender of an indicted fugitive of the International 
Criminal Court believed to be present on such Party’s territory or in a neighboring 
country that also has provided written consent for the ICC Protocol Team to operate on 
its territory if necessary, particularly in hot pursuit.  
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3. Any deployment of the ICC Protocol Team into the territory of a Receiving Party 
requires a request by the ICC Prosecutor, a written consent by the Receiving Party, and 
the approval of the PSG.   
 
4. A Protocol Party may request the deployment of the ICC Protocol Team onto its 
territory for the sole purpose of arresting or facilitating the surrender of an indicted 
fugitive of the International Criminal Court. Any such request shall be in writing and 
delivered to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court. The ICC Prosecutor 
then may act upon the request by submitting his or her own request to the PSG. Any 
subsequent deployment of the ICC Protocol Team into the territory of the Receiving 
Party shall require the prior approval of the PSG.  
 
5. The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court may initiate with a Protocol Party a 
request for deployment of the ICC Protocol Team into the territory of such Party for the 
sole purpose of arresting or facilitating the surrender of an indicted fugitive of the 
International Criminal Court. If such Protocol Party delivers a written consent thereof 
to the Prosecutor, the Prosecutor shall notify the PSG of such request and written 
consent. Any subsequent deployment of the ICC Protocol Team into the territory of the 
Receiving Party following its express consent shall require the prior approval of the 
PSG.  
Commentary: 
¶57  There is a central requirement for any deployment of the ICC Protocol Team: the 
consent of the Receiving Party. The Protocol fully respects the sovereign rights of the 
Receiving Party in the requirements that the Receiving Party be a State Party to the 
Protocol, that there be a Contingency Agreement ratified between the Receiving Party 
and the PSG, and that the Receiving Party grant its prior written consent to the 
deployment of the ICC Protocol Team onto its territory for each operation pertaining to 
an indicted fugitive. Until those requirements are met, there can be no such deployment. 
Once the deployment is made, operations must conform to the Protocol’s provisions and 
the Contingency Agreement. 
¶58  The procedures for a deployment of the ICC Protocol Team require a request by the 
ICC Prosecutor either acting at his or her own initiative or following a request from the 
Receiving Party, then the approval of the PSG, and finally the written consent of the 
Receiving Party. The sole purpose of any deployment would be to track and arrest one or 
more indicted fugitives of the ICC believed to be located on the territory of the Receiving 
Party. It is important to confirm that there is no other objective (other than tracking and 
apprehending indicted fugitives) that can be approved or undertaken by the ICC Protocol 
Team. 
¶59  The Receiving Party must provide all necessary access to and mobility within its 
territory for the ICC Protocol Team, including logistical support as agreed between the 
PSG and the Receiving Party in its Contingency Agreement. 




1. Each Protocol Party shall enter into a Contingency Agreement with the PSG as soon as 
possible following entry into force of this Protocol for such Party. The ICC Protocol 
Team may not be deployed into the territory of any Protocol Party until a Contingency 
Agreement meeting the requirements of this Protocol has entered into force between 
such Party and the PSG. 
 
2. The Contingency Agreement shall provide for: 
a. efficient entry of the ICC Protocol Team into the territory of the Receiving Party 
granting consent pursuant to Article VII, including rapid compliance with 
immigration procedures and the provision of necessary national personnel 
(including interpreters and translators) to facilitate the entry and movement of 
the ICC Protocol Team on the territory of the Receiving Party; 
b. access to base facilities for stationing of the ICC Protocol Team as deemed 
appropriate by the Joint Command Group; 
c. requisite privileges and immunities for personnel of the ICC Protocol Team; 
d. specification of conditions required by the Receiving Party for the stationing 
and operation of the ICC Protocol Team on its territory; 
e. collaborative relationships and operations with national military or police 
forces;  
f. timely medical treatment of personnel of the ICC Protocol Team when that is 
deemed necessary by commanders of the ICC Protocol Team; 
g. waivers of any national or local laws prohibiting or restricting the importation 
or use of any weapons or tracking technology or the payment of any tariffs or 
taxes or fees relating to such items that are required, at the sole discretion of the 
Joint Command Group, for the efficient operation of the ICC Protocol Team in 
the Receiving Party; 
h. procedures for the disposition of matters of criminal law or military justice with 
respect to personnel of the ICC Protocol Team in a manner consistent with this 
Protocol;  
i. a field headquarters facility in a secure location of the territory of the Receiving 
Party for use by the leadership of the ICC Protocol Team; 
j. communications between the Joint Command Group and national government, 
military, and police authorities; and 
k. respect for identified local customs and law that do not conflict with 
international human rights law or international humanitarian law.  
 
3. The Contingency Agreement shall conform to the greatest extent possible with the form 
agreement set forth in Annex A of this Protocol. 
Commentary: 
¶60  One of the key advantages of the existence of the ICC Protocol Team would be its 
relatively rapid availability to track and apprehend indicted fugitives on the territory of a 
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Protocol Party once that government has consented to such deployment. The logistical 
details and political understandings that must be achieved in order for the deployment to 
take place can delay and ultimately even cripple efforts to send the ICC Protocol Team 
into the Protocol Party’s territory. The Protocol thus requires, in Article VIII, that each 
Protocol Party enter into a Contingency Agreement with the PSG to iron out a range of 
issues that would logically arise in the deployment of foreign forces, police, and civilian 
personnel onto the Protocol Party’s territory for the purpose of tracking and apprehending 
indicted fugitives of the ICC. Until such a Contingency Agreement is concluded between 
the PSG and the Protocol Party, there can be no deployment of the ICC Protocol Team on 
the territory of such Protocol Party (as the Receiving Party). 
¶61 Logistical matters addressed in the Contingency Agreement would include:  
¶62  —visa status for the rapid entry of personnel of the ICC Protocol Team;  
¶63  —collaborative relationships and operations with national military or police forces; 
¶64  —access to base facilities;  
¶65  —domestic transport arrangements;  
¶66  —provision of interpreters and translators;  
¶67  —requisite privileges and immunities for personnel of the ICC Protocol Team; 
¶68  —special conditions required by the Receiving Party for the stationing and 
 operation of the ICC Protocol Team on its territory;  
¶69  —timely medical treatment of personnel of the ICC Protocol Team when that is 
 deemed necessary by commanders of the ICC Protocol Team; 
¶70  —waivers of any national or local laws prohibiting or restricting the importation or 
 use of any weapons or tracking technology or the payment of any tariffs or taxes or 
 fees relating to such items that are required, at the sole discretion of the Joint 
 Command Group, for the efficient operation of the ICC Protocol Team in the 
 Receiving Party;  
¶71  —procedures for the disposition of matters of criminal law or military justice with 
 respect to personnel of the ICC Protocol Team in a manner consistent with this 
 Protocol; 
¶72  —a field headquarters facility in a secure location for use by the leadership of the 
 ICC Protocol Team;  
¶73  —communications between the Joint Command Group and national government, 
 military, and police authorities; and 
¶74  —respect for identified local customs and law that do not conflict with 
 international human rights law or international humanitarian law.  
¶75  
¶76  These requirements would be negotiated in advance, basically on general terms, 
through completion of the Contingency Agreement in order to be prepared for any future 
possible deployment of the ICC Protocol Team to the Protocol Party’s territory. With 
these matters well settled between the PSG and the Receiving Party in the Contingency 
Agreement, the introduction of the ICC Protocol Team on the Receiving Party’s territory 
would be greatly facilitated and rapidly achievable once an operation is requested by the 
ICC Prosecutor and the Receiving Party has granted its required consent for the new 
operation. 
¶77  Annex A of the Protocol would set forth a model Contingency Agreement as a 
guide to Parties of what to negotiate and agree upon prior to any deployment of the ICC 
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Protocol Team, and to negotiate the standards terms far in advance of any actual 
deployment.13 
ARTICLE IX 
TRACKING, APPREHENSION, AND TRANSPORT OF INDICTEES 
1. The ICC Protocol Team shall undertake measures to skillfully track indicted fugitives, 
coordinating closely with and using, with the consent of the ICC Prosecutor, any 
tracking unit established by the ICC Prosecutor and, when possible and feasible, with 
national authorities and international agencies and any government willing to share 
information or other skills.  
 
2. The ICC Protocol Team shall develop and implement an arrest strategy in close 
coordination with the ICC Prosecutor with regard to indicted fugitives who are the 
target of any particular operation. Any such strategy shall follow explicit guidelines set 
forth in this Protocol and in the Contingency Agreement of the Receiving Party. 
 
3. The arrest of an apprehended indictee shall be made by a representative of the Office of 
the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court as soon as possible following the 
physical apprehension or surrender of the indictee. The Contingency Agreement shall 
establish the procedures for ready access by such OTP representative to the 
apprehended indictee.  
 
4. Within ten days of the apprehension of an indicted fugitive by the ICC Protocol Team, 
that individual shall be transported by air, if possible, or by another means of transport 
if necessary to The Hague to appear before the International Criminal Court or, if 
approved by the International Criminal Court, to appropriate national authorities. The 
Receiving Party shall facilitate, in coordination with the ICC Prosecutor and the 
Registrar of the International Criminal Court, all arrangements for the transport of 
such arrested indictee from its territory to The Hague or to an alternative destination 
approved by the International Criminal Court and requested by the ICC Registrar, and 
shall do so rapidly in accordance with the procedures set forth in the Contingency 
Agreement with the Receiving Party. Other Parties, non-party States, and organizations 
may voluntarily assist with transport of the arrested indictee at the request of the 
Receiving Party or the ICC Registrar. 
Commentary: 
¶78  The Protocol stipulates the modalities for tracking indicted fugitives and requires 
that the ICC Protocol Team coordinate with the ICC Prosecutor and national authorities 
on tracking matters. The tracking function obviously would be a major responsibility of 
the ICC Protocol Team, which would have to draw up the strategy for the tracking and 
arrest operation in close cooperation with the ICC Prosecutor. Another major 
                                                        
13
 I have omitted any model draft of a Contingency Agreement here but recognize that it would be a useful 
document to make available to governments and thus would be desirable as a next step in the process. 
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responsibility would be the individual who makes the arrest, and who would need to be 
an OTP official. That official would require rapid access to the territory of the Receiving 
Party for this purpose.  
¶79  The transport of the arrested indictee also requires coordination among the 
Receiving Party, the relevant organs of the International Criminal Court (namely, the ICC 
Prosecutor and the ICC Registrar), and any other Party, non-party State, or organization 
that may be requested by the Receiving Party or the ICC Prosecutor or ICC Registrar to 
assist, voluntarily, with transport requirements. The Protocol should envisage the 
possibility of transport to an alternative jurisdiction (rather than The Hague) in the event 
the International Criminal Court needs to hold the arrested indictee outside of the 
Netherlands at an approved location for some period of time prior to transport to The 




1. Expenses of the PSG, the Joint Command Group, and the ICC Protocol Team (the 
“Protocol Group”) shall be paid from the funds contributed by Protocol Parties and, as 
stipulated below, from in-kind support through the deployment of seconded personnel 
and in-kind provision of equipment, supplies, or other logistical support. 
 
2. The cost of any commitment of personnel shall be borne by the Sending Party itself and 
by any other Party to this Protocol contributing funds voluntarily for such purpose or 
by any State or organization or private benefactor or any combination thereof 
contributing funds voluntarily for such purpose, provided the PSG approves of the 
voluntary contribution in advance. The costs of non-personnel support for the ICC 
Protocol Team shall be borne to the extent possible by the Sending Party and, where 
necessary and agreed to by the PSG in advance, by other voluntary funders and from 
the PSG annual budget. 
 
3. The expenses of the Protocol Group, tabulated in the annual budget prepared by the 
PSG, shall be provided from the following sources: 
a. assessed contributions by and any supplemental voluntary funds from the 
Protocol Parties; 
b. funds provided voluntarily by non-party States, organizations, or private 
individuals;  
c. in-kind provision of equipment, supplies, and logistical support (including 
required weapons, tracking gear, transport on air, sea, or land); and 
d. with respect to personnel deployed by a Sending Party, the national-scale 
salaries and benefits of such personnel paid directly to such personnel through 
the standard procedures of such Sending Party that have been established for 
their domestic stationing or foreign deployment in non-Protocol situations.  
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4. The contributions of Protocol Parties shall be assessed in accordance with an agreed 
scale of assessment that is based on the scale adopted by the United Nations for its 
regular budget and adjusted in accordance with the principles on which that scale is 
based. 
 
5. The records, books, and accounts of the Protocol Group, including its annual financial 
statements, shall be audited annually by an independent auditor. 
Commentary: 
¶80  The primary source of funding for any operation of the ICC Protocol Team would 
be the Sending Party committing personnel, supplies, and logistical support for the 
operation. The essential principle of funding is that participating Parties in the ICC 
Protocol Team would cover their own costs of participation to the greatest extent 
possible. It is doubtful that the project could be launched and maintained if it were 
entirely dependent on an assessed budget drawn from all of the Parties to the Protocol. 
And to do so would discourage States that wish to participate but know they cannot bear 
even a proportionate share of the financial burden of military and law enforcement 
operations of the ICC Protocol Team, but would be willing to pay assessments fairly 
allocated among Protocol Parties. 
¶81  Article X thus provides for a financial structure that has as its foundation 
assessments from the Protocol Parties to cover the largely administrative expenses of the 
PSG, the Joint Command Group, and the ICC Protocol Team (the “Protocol Group”), but 
that the expenses associated with personnel required for the ICC Protocol Team must be 
paid by the Sending Party and any other Party, non-party State, or organization that 
voluntarily wishes to help cover such expenses and is approved for this purpose by the 
PSG in advance. As for supplies and logistical support expenses, those too should be 
covered to the extent possible by the Sending Party, but the cost can be shared with 
others willing to make voluntary contributions, provided the PSG approves of such 
support in advance. The reason is to ensure oversight of the sources and character of such 
financial and in-kind support and further to ensure coordination of the provision of 
support to the Sending Party and to the ICC Protocol Team. 
¶82  The scale of assessments for the Protocol Parties would be the same as that used at 
the United Nations, adjusted to reflect the smaller number of States that would be 
Protocol Parties. Like the Rome Statute, the Protocol would require an annual 
independent audit of the records, books, and accounts, including annual financial 
statements. 
ARTICLE XI 
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 
¶83 Any dispute between two or more Protocol Parties relating to the interpretation or 
application of this Protocol which is not settled through negotiations between or among 
such disputing Protocol Parties within three months of their commencement shall be 
referred to the PSG. The PSG may itself seek to settle the dispute or may make 
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recommendations on further means of settlement of the dispute, including referral to the 
Registrar of the International Criminal Court to serve as a mediator of the dispute or for 
adjudication before the International Court of Justice in conformity with the Statute of 
that Court. The Protocol Parties agree to submit to the jurisdiction of the International 
Court of Justice for such purpose if requested by the PSG. 
Commentary: 
¶84  The resolution of disputes between or among the Protocol Parties would be 
undertaken first through diplomatic channels between or among the disputing Protocol 
Parties and, if unresolved after three months, sent to the PSG for resolution. If the PSG 
fails to resolve the dispute, it may then submit it either to the Registrar of the 
International Criminal Court for mediation, or, either failing that effort, or as an 
alternative to the ICC Registrar, to the International Court of Justice. Article XI thus 
constitutes a compromissory clause of agreed submission by the Protocol Parties of their 




¶85  No reservations may be made to this Protocol. 
Commentary: 
¶86  In keeping with the Rome Statute, the Protocol would not permit reservations. This 
may prove contentious during negotiations of the drafting of the Protocol, and some 
States may bring forth considerations that point to the need for some kind of right to 
reservations from the Protocol because the Protocol does not have precisely the same 
character as the Rome Statute, which addresses issues of international criminal law and, 
indirectly, international human rights principles. 
ARTICLE XIII 
AMENDMENTS 
1. Any Protocol Party may propose an amendment to this Protocol and within three 
months of such proposal the PSG shall convene all Protocol Parties for consideration 
of such proposed amendment.  
 
2. The adoption of an amendment shall require a two-thirds majority vote of approval by 
all Protocol Parties at a meeting convened by the PSG. 
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3. An amendment shall enter into force for all Protocol Parties one year after instruments 
of ratification or acceptance have been deposited with the Registrar of the International 
Criminal Court by seven-eighths of them. 
 
4. Any Protocol Party that has not accepted the amendment may withdraw from this 
Protocol in accordance with Article XVI of this Protocol.  
Commentary: 
¶87  Procedures for amendments to the Protocol are set forth in Article XIII and mirror 
some of the relevant procedures of Article 121 of the Rome Statute, although the latter 
deals with a far more complex set of circumstances. There is a right of withdrawal from 
the Protocol by any Party that does not accept the amendment, but the right must be 
exercised within one year of the amendment’s entry into force.  
ARTICLE XIV 
SIGNATURE, RATIFICATION, ACCEPTANCE, APPROVAL OR ACCESSION 
1. This Protocol shall be open for signature by the International Criminal Court, all 
States, and organizations approved by the Assembly of States Parties of the 
International Criminal Court in The Hague at the Registrar’s Office in the 
headquarters of the International Criminal Court in The Hague, Netherlands. 
 
2. This Protocol is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatories. 
Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the 
Registrar of the International Criminal Court. 
 
3. This Protocol shall be open to accession by all States and approved organizations. 
Instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Registrar of the International 
Criminal Court. 
Commentary: 
¶88  Article XIV has standard provisions on signature, ratification, etc., drawn from the 
Rome Statute. But the Registrar of the International Criminal Court would be the 
designated depository for such documents. 
ARTICLE XV 
ENTRY INTO FORCE 
1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day 
following the date of the deposit of the tenth instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession with the Registrar of the International Criminal Court provided 
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there already has been deposited with the Registrar the ratification of the International 
Criminal Court, by appropriate action of the Assembly of States Parties.  
 
2. For each State or organization ratifying, accepting, approving, or acceding to this 
Protocol after the entry into force of the Protocol pursuant to this Article, the Protocol 
shall enter into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the 
deposit by such State or organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession. 
Commentary: 
¶89  Entry into force of the Protocol requires two significant events: 1) the International 
Criminal Court must become a Party to the Protocol; and 2) at least ten States must 
become Parties to the Protocol. The International Criminal Court’s participation is so 
critical to the operations of the Protocol Group that there would be no point in 
implementing the Protocol without the Court’s direct and obligatory engagement. The 
relatively low number of ratifying Parties reflects the simple reality that there remain a 
limited number of situations under litigation at the International Criminal Court and thus 
it may prove very useful for key States, such as where indicted fugitives are known or 
believed to be located and others that could be of significant assistance in tracking and 
apprehension operations, to join together so that the deployment of the newly-created 
ICC Protocol Team could be achieved as quickly as possible. 
ARTICLE XVI 
RIGHT OF WITHDRAWAL 
1. A Protocol Party may, by written notification to the Registrar of the International 
Criminal Court that is simultaneously copied to the PSG, withdraw from this Protocol. 
The withdrawal shall take effect one month after the date of receipt of the notification, 
unless the notification specifies a later date.  
 
2. A withdrawal by the International Criminal Court from this Protocol would terminate 
the Protocol for all Parties as of the effective date of withdrawal by the International 
Criminal Court.  
 
3. A State or organization shall not be discharged, by reason of its withdrawal, from the 
obligations arising from this Protocol while it was a Party to the Protocol, including 
any financial obligations that it may have accrued. If the State is a Member State of the 
International Criminal Court, its financial obligations and duty to cooperate with the 
International Criminal Court under the Rome Statute shall continue.  
Commentary: 
¶90  The Protocol would have a somewhat novel withdrawal clause. Given the 
operational character and personnel risks associated with the ICC Protocol Team, a Party 
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should have the right to withdraw with one month’s notice (rather than one year). This 
would give the participating government confidence that it can disengage quickly not 
only from a theater of operation but from the Protocol itself, which is a voluntary 
undertaking to begin with, if circumstances, political or otherwise, require such 
withdrawal.  
¶91  The other unorthodox feature of the Protocol is the automatic termination of the 
Protocol in the event its anchor Party, the International Criminal Court, were to withdraw 
from the treaty. The ICC Protocol Team simply cannot and should not function without 
the full participation of the ICC Prosecutor, ICC Registrar, and Assembly of States 
Parties in its various operations and structural requirements. Thus, a withdrawal by the 
International Criminal Court, presumably upon determination of the Assembly of States 
Parties, would fatally undermine the entire rationale of the Protocol. 
¶92  However, outstanding financial obligations under the Protocol accrued by a 
withdrawing Party would need to be paid by such withdrawing Party. 
ARTICLE XVII 
AUTHENTIC TEXTS 
¶93 The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian, 
and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Registrar of the 
International Criminal Court, who shall send certified copies thereof to all Protocol 
Parties. 
¶94  
¶95 In Witness Whereof, the undersigned, being duly authorized thereto by their respective 
¶96 Governments or Institutions, have signed this Protocol. 
¶97  
¶98 Done at _______, this ____ day of _____ 20__. 
Commentary: 
¶99  This is a standard provision, drawn from the Rome Statute, on authentic language 




¶102  It is my hope that this draft Protocol will inspire some forward movement in 
improving the arrest capabilities of the International Criminal Court with the support not 
only of States Parties to the Rome Statute, but also of key non-party States, including the 
United States of America, which can enhance their own security and allegiance to the 
rule of law by facilitating the apprehension of such indicted fugitives and help meet a 
worthy common objective for all of humankind.  
